Chapter
Sixteen
A
Grave or a Free Home
As the Federals were found to be
force, the Confederates did not follow up on their victories at New Hope Church and Pickett’s Mill. Instead, the
rest of May and the first of June were occupied in a slow retrograde movement
guarding the railroad. By the first week of June, Johnston’s army was positioned on the Lost
Mountain Line. Here, they entrenched themselves along a series of low hills
extending from Lost Mountain on their left, Pine Mountain as center, and crossing
the railroad, terminating at Brush Mountain.
Cleburne’s
Division was positioned on the army’s left near the northern end of Kennesaw Mountain. During these days of
skirmishing and cannonading, an incessant drizzle fell, giving the general a
bad cold and Brigadier General Polk took over temporary command. While
recuperating, Cleburne
wrote and reread letters to Miss Tarleton.
His aide-de-camp, Mangum recalled:
Letters which he
wrote to his betrothed were sometimes read to the writer amidst some quite camp
scenes, and were often revelations, even to one who knew him well, as to the
depth of his feelings. Devoid of all approach to sentimentality, they were full
of a most sweet and tender passion.
Once,
Cleburne
complained that Sue wrote too big and left too large a space between lines. (1)
On June 14, an artillery shell
from an enemy’s position in front of Pine
Mountain killed Leonidas
Polk, the “Bishop General”. Because the gunner had apparently taken a
deliberate aim at the bishop, the Confederates were outraged. As he was carried
by on a litter, Sam Watkins recalled that “I felt that I had lost a friend whom
I had ever loved and respected, and that the South had lost one of her best and
greatest generals.” Johnston
appointed Polk’s senior division commander, William Loring, to command the
corps. Three days later, an artillery shell shot Lucius Polk’s horse from under
him and left his tore a large portion of his left calf. Polk was brought to the
surgeon inside division headquarters and remarked to Cleburne, “Well, I think I will be able to
get a furlough now!” Polk’s wound left him unfit for further command and his
brigade, because of it high percentage of casualties, was divided among Cleburne’s other brigades
in his division. (2)
After fierce skirmishing along Mud River,
the division followed the army as it established a new line of battle along Kennesaw Mountain
two miles west of Marietta.
“Kennesaw, the bold and striking twin mountains lay before me”, recalled Sherman. “On each of
these peaks the enemy had his signal stations. The summits were crowned with
batteries, and the spurs were alive with men busy in felling trees, digging
pits, and preparing for the ground struggle impending”. As Johnston’s
army was stretched thinly across a distance of six miles, Sherman employed a new tactic which he hoped
would break the line and the spirit of the Confederates: a frontal assault. As
Longstreet had done at Chickamauga and Howard had attempted to do at Pickett’s
Mill, Sherman instructed his three army commanders to form their men en
mass—five brigades covering a short distance of 1000 yards—and march them up
the twin peaks of Kennesaw. The Confederates were exuberant. Finally, after
months of flank movements pushing them deeper into Georgia, a pitched battle would
occur. It was exactly what Joe Johnston wanted. (3)
“On the fatal morning of June
27”, wrote Sam Watkins “the sun rose clear and cloudless, the heavens seemed
made of brass, and the earth of iron, and as the sun began to mount towards the
zenith, everything became quite”. The Confederates were prepared. All along the
ridge, Johnston
had constructed a series of defenses. First, the close ranks would encounter a
chest-high barrier of felled trees called tangle foot. Next, they would hit a
row if sharp wooden spikes driven into the ground; beyond these was the 19th
century’s equivalent to barbed wire, chevaux-de-frise, wrapped along piled
logs. “On the distant hills we could plainly see officers dashing about hither
and thither, and the Stars and Stripes moving to and fro, and we knew the
Federals were making preparations for the mighty contest” continued Watkins. At
8am, Cleburne’s
Division, posted on the southern end of Kennesaw, heard the sound of artillery
and musketry to the north. Shortly thereafter, the sound died down signaling
the line had held. (4)
At 10am, Howard’s Corps emerged
out of some woods, advancing in perfect formation towards Cleburne and Cheatham’s position. In Cleburne’s front, 8,000
blue coats under generals Harker and Wagner were met at long range by the
sharpshooters and solid shot from artillery pieces posted above the division.
With great difficulty, these men struggled through the defenses and then
charged with bayonets fixed towards the entrenched Confederates. Cleburne’s sharpshooters
retired into the main line, which opened fire when the oncoming Federals were
within 60 yards. After this first destructive volley, the men fired at will and
the artillerists charged their guns with double canister. Amazingly, a few
Federals breached the line, but these were quickly bayoneted or clubbed. What
was left of the Federal line escaped down the mountain. As soon as the enemy
had fled, Cleburne’s
men collapsed into the trenches, dehydrated and almost choked from the summer
heat and the thick smoke. Not surprisingly, a fire had been ignited on the dry
pine needles and now threatened to envelop the wounded in Cleburne’s front. Lieutenant Colonel William
Martin grabbed a white flag and jumped over the works shouting “Boys this is
butchery. Cease firing and help get out those men.” The Confederates pulled
many Federals to safety behind their lines and then the truce ended and the
fighting began again. “We realized now, as never before, the futility of direct
assault upon entrenched lines,” wrote General Howard. In Cleburne’s front lay 1,000 dead and wounded
Federals while his division had lost but 2 killed, 9 wounded. This number was
proportionate all along the line. While Sherman
claimed his losses totaled 3,000 Johnston
disputed this:
Such a loss, in the
large force that must have been furnished for a decisive and general attack by
an army of almost a hundred thousand men, would have been utterly
insignificant—too trifling to discourage, much less defeat brave soldiers, such
as composed General Sherman’s army. It does injustice to Southern marksmanship,
too. The fire of twenty thousand infantry inured to battle, and entrenched, and
of fifty field-pieces poured into such columns, frequently within pistol=shot,
must have done much greater execution.
Echoing
Sherman’s boast, a Confederate private said: “H---
had broke loose in Georgia,
sure enough!”(5)
The decisive battle notwithstanding, Sherman had once again outflanked Johnston’s
position, forcing a fall back across the Chattahoochee River.
For President Davis, this was the last straw. With Bragg’s prodding, Davis removed Johnston
and appointed John Bell Hood to the temporarily rank of general. When the
soldiers heard of this they were outraged and spoke of going home. Sherman’s men also heard
of the change and rejoiced. In his farewell address to the troops on July 17, Johnston said:
In obedience to
orders of the War Department, I turn over to General Hood the command of the
Army and Department of Tennessee. I cannot leave this noble army without
expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed. A
long and arduous campaign has made conspicuous every soldierly virtue,
endurance to toil, obedience to orders, brilliant courage. The enemy never
attacked but to be repulsed and severely punished. You soldiers have never
argued but from your courage and never counted your foes. No longer your
leader, I will still watch your career and rejoice in your victories. To one
and all I offer assurance of my friendship and bid you an affectionate
farewell.
Before
leaving, Johnston
explained his plan for winning the campaign. As had been done since Dalton, Johnston would only
fight Sherman
when the advantage was theirs, such as while crossing Peachtree Creek. Through
partial engagements, the enemy would be draw to the entrenchments outside of Atlanta where the advantage
would be theirs while additional troops were obtained. Hood did not even
consider these proposals; his orders from Davis
were to attack. Beginning as soon as Johnston
left, Hood’s “disastrous operations” would ultimately terminate at a peaceful
valley in Franklin, Tennessee. (6)
Cleburne “believed that the
death warrant of the Confederacy had been sealed when Gen. Joseph E. Johnson
was removed to give place to a leader who had nothing but courage and dash to
recommend him.” There was little time to consider the situation, however. In
the quick yet costly secession of battles for Atlanta,
Cleburne’s
Division was constantly on the frontline. Brigadier General Govan recalled:
It was a campaign
that tried the endurance of the soldier to the utmost extent, and tried his
soldierly qualities as in a crucible. We slept on our arms, lulled to sleep (if
we slept at all) to the sound of the bullet, and awoke in the morning saluted
by artillery.
The
sharpshooters were equally busy during this final stage of the campaign. To an
advancing enemy or an unlimbering artillery crew, it was “almost certain death”
when within 900 yards of this famous corps—once, a Federal was hit at 1,600
yards. Although they inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, they also
suffered losses. From Dalton to Atlanta, the corps lost 25% killed and 60%
wounded. These vacancies were soon filled from a long list of marksmen, eager
to be transferred from the regular infantry. At the time of the split up of
Polk’s Brigade, Cleburne
delivered an address to 40 men of a sharpshooter’s battalion:
As a battalion of
sharpshooters its courage, skill, and endurance have been tested and proven in
innumerable bloody skirmishes. The hand full to which it is reduced attest how
conspicuous a part it must have borne in building up the glorious reputation of
the brigade and division which it is about to be separated from. Gen. Cleburne
bids you a soldier’s farewell, and trusts he may deserve and retain through
life the good will and kind feelings which he bears to each surviving member of
the Forty-eighth Tennessee. (7)
On July 19, Hood called his
commanders together for a council of war. He told them his intention of
attacking Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland
after it crossed Peach Tree Creek with Hardee and Stewart’s Corps while Wheeler
held back reinforcements from the east. As the morning progressed, Hood changed
plans and shifted the attack to the right. Unfortunately, this delay gave
Thomas’s men time to construct earthworks and Walker’s attack was promptly driven back.
Initially ordered to support Walker, Cleburne’s orders were
revised with a urgent request to move up from reserve to the Confederate right,
where Wheeler’ s line was being bent.
The division passed through Atlanta towards its
destination as darkness fell. Wheeler was relieved to see help; all day he had
been sending urgent messages to Hood, informing him that he was holding back
two entire corps. Cleburne’s
Division nervously constructed earthworks that night as flashes from enemy
cannon could be seen in the distance. Once, and without warning, a well placed
shell crashed into the line, blowing 40 men apart.
As the sun rose the next morning, July 21,
the men were awakened from behind the partial cover of the earthworks by an
artillery barrage. Cleburne
knew this was a precursor to an infantry attack and sent a hastily-written
letter to Hood, requesting backup. By 8am, the Federals had pushed back the
cavalry and were marching for the division’s position. Cleburne’s line was so overlapped that he had
to place a detachment of cavalry to extend his right; these however, stayed
only long enough to fire one volley then retreated, advising the infantry to do
the same. Cleburne
was hardly ready to fall back though. Once again, he was all that stood between
the enemy and Atlanta.
The Texas Brigade counterattacked on the right, driving the enemy back and
extending the line. Cheatham’s old division, now commanded by George Maney,
arrived and helped Cleburne’s Division fight off
a series of attacks from General McPherson which Cleburne called “the bitterest day’s
fighting” of his life. When night fell, Cleburne
had achieved his objective of keeping the enemy out of Atlanta. The Confederates lost 300 men and
McPherson lost 728 men. (8)
At 8pm, Cleburne received orders to quietly abandon
his works and fall back into the city.
Collapsing asleep outside of Hardee’s headquarters, the men received only
a short rest. After a conference with Hardee and Hood, Cleburne aroused the weary division and
informed them of their new orders. With the rest of Hardee’s Corps, which Hood
claimed were “fresh”, Cleburne’s Division would exit the city, marching southeast,
and search for the flank and rear of the enemy approaching from Decatur. While
this “Stonewall Jackson-like” attack was unfolding, Hood was to send Cheatham’s
Corps to attack the enemy’s front.
Under the light of a full moon, Hardee’s
Corps marched south on the McDonough
Road, then southeast, and finally northeast to Decatur. Shortly before
dawn, the column halted and unceremoniously fell asleep along the side of the
road. For Cleburne
and the other commanders, however, there was no sleep. By the time the sun was
up, a plan had been agreed on: Bate and Walker
would march two miles northwest of the road and, finding the exposed flank,
attack. Meanwhile, Cleburne and Maney would
march along the road until coming in contact with Walker’s line to their right.
Shortly after 12:30, Cleburne and Maney moved forward. It was
oblivious that they were on the enemy’s flank: the surprised Federals quickly
abandoned their positions, leaving wagons, caissons, and ambulances to the
advancing Confederates. J.A. Smith, temporally commanding the Texas Brigade due
to Granbury’s severe illness, complained that there was an “ungovernable
enthusiasm of the men” in his command at this sight. This swift engulfment of
the Federal right resulted in the death of McPherson—their only army commander
to be killed in battle during the entire war. (9)
Govan, facing formidable and well-defended
works, requested reinforcements. Cleburne
sent a staff officer to Lowrey to tell him to support Govan’s position. On the
way, the staff officer noticed a large gap forming between Cleburne’s
right and Walker’s
left and gave Lowrey his orders but also informed him of this gap. Lowrey,
without hesitation, disobeyed Cleburne’s
orders and filled the gap—a move which may have saved the division from destruction.
When Cleburne
heard of it, he commended Lowrey for his proactive-ness. But there was still a grave problem: the
enemy in Govan’s front. Cleburne
ordered Key to advance his batteries with the infantry to blast them from their
position. Hit on their front by Key’s Howitzers, the Federals broke after a
well-timed charge by the Texans. Federal General Leggett recalled of the
charge:
[The Texans] emerged
from their concealment in the woods, and yelling as only the steer-drivers of
Texas could yell, charged upon our division…On came the Texans; but they were
met by a continuous volley of musketry and shrapnel, shell, and canister from
our six-rifled Rodman’s and Cooper’s howitzers. It seemed as if no man of all
the host who were attacking us could escape alive; and yet, still yelling, they
persisted in their desperate undertaking.
In the final push to break the line of a
third enemy position on top of Bald Hill, Sam Watkins recalled:
We advanced to the
attack on Cleburne’s
immediate left. Cleburne
himself was leading us in person, so that we would not fire upon his men, who
were then inside the Yankee line. His sword was drawn. I heard him say, “Follow
me boys.” He ran forward, and amid the blazing fires of the Yankee guns was
soon on top of the enemy’s works…We were but a few paces behind, following
close upon him, and soon captured their line of works.
The
fighting lasted the remainder of the day as possession of Bald Hill flipped
back and forth. As night fell, the Federals were in possession of it. Cleburne’s Division fell
back to a former position and had a much needed rest. Although its success had
been only partial, despite 1,388 casualties, the division’s capture of Bald
Hill was the Confederate’s high-water mark in the battle. Hood had not committed
Cheatham’s Corps until Hardee’s attack was loosing momentum and therefore it
was repulsed. General Walker, who had shown such contempt for Cleburne’s memorial, had been killed in the
first charge. Hood claimed Bald Hill was a victory, but neither Davis nor the
soldiers believed this. Wrote one private: “The splendid, unconquered army was
swept off the earth into the grave…This was Hood’s second defeat. In two
battles he had lost 10,000 men—more than we had lost in the whole campaign, in
seventy-four days’ battles and skirmishes. It would not take long with such
tactics to wipe out our army.” Likewise, Davis
sent Hood an urgent message: “Stop attacking before you completely destroy the
army.” (10)
In the following weeks, Cleburne’s
Division followed Sherman’s army as it extended
its lines southwest of Atlanta.
On August 10, he received a letter from Colonel D. H. Smith of Morgan’s
Cavalry, informing him of his brother Chris’ death. In a letter to his family, Cleburne relayed:
I have just received
the sad news that Captain Chris Cleburne was killed in action at Dublin Depot
on the East Ten & Va. Rail
Road. My informant states he was killed May 9th
1864 leading a charge. Chris’s grave has been substantially enclosed, carefully
sodded and marked with his name. It is at or near Dublin Depot and a head board
erected over it contains not only his name but his Regiment, date of his death,
and the inscription “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.” [It is sweet and
glorious to die for one’s country.] Some kind ladies of the neighborhood have
promised to plant over it appropriate flowers and to make its care his grateful
charge. I have written to find the particulars of his death. The moment I get
them I will forward to you. This is not the place or time, Robert, to tell you
how I feel about my young brother’s death. I cannot say however that I was
surprised to hear it. His ardent, fearless self sacrificing nature made me
anticipate such a result. He had just been promoted from Pt to Captain and this
was his first battle of capacity. (11)
On August 30, the mystery at to where Sherman would attack was solved when the lead column of a
strong Federal force appeared south of Cleburne’s
position at Jonesboro.
Leaving Cleburne in temporary command of the
corps, Hardee rode to Atlanta
on an engine sent by Hood to discuss what actions should be taken. Now in
command, Cleburne
sent scouts to reconnoiter the enemy’s positions. When they did not come back, Cleburne himself
reconnoitered the enemy’s positions and narrowly escaped getting shot by a
group of Federals guarding a bridge. Returning to camp, Hardee instructed Cleburne to lead the corps to Jonesboro that night to be ready for an
attack that next morning. Knowing that to try to take the direct route by
storming the heavily guarded bridge would cost him men and time, Cleburne decided to take
an alternate route.
The slow night march seemed to take
forever; especially when it was learned that all that separated Cleburne’s unguarded
columns from a large detachment of Federals was a narrow wooded ridge. “I
trembled for the division,” wrote Benham. At daylight, as the first units of
the corps reached their destination, Hardee rode up. Hardee explained that Cleburne was to retain command of the corps and fight with
Stephen D. Lee’s Corps in an attack against the well-entrenched semi-circle of Logan’s XV Corps and two
other divisions—in all, 20,000 men. He, himself, would direct Cleburne’s
and Lee’s movements as they assaulted and, hopefully, pushed the Federals back
across the Flint River. Cleburne’s Corps, composed of his division on
the left, Brown’s Division on the right, and Maney’s Division as reserve, would
open the battle with an assault against the Federal right perpendicular to the
river. At the sound of musketry, Lee’s Corps would attack the Federal’s front. If they succeeded, Atlanta
would be safe; if they failed, Atlanta
would have to be abandoned. (12)
Cleburne’s Corps advanced, swinging to the
northeast, by 3:15pm on August 31. Lowrey, commanding Cleburne’s Division, met the enemy’s
skirmishers under Kilpatrick around 3:30. Captain Sam Foster recalled:
Our whole line
advances, and a most terrific battle opens here in the open ground. It so
happened that our Brigd. was on the extreme left of the line, and in the charge
we missed the Yanks infantry, and struck their cav. They were armed with
[breech] loaders and Six Shooters and had built some breastworks of rails, and
had position along the edge of a field, across which we had to charge to get to
them.
General
Lee, believing this fight is Cleburne’s
Corps striking the Federal’s flank, ordered his men forward against the
Federal’s well-entrenched front. Meanwhile, Lowrey’s Division had pushed the
cavalry back and pursued them across the Flint River.
Lowrey, realizing his men were straying from the rest of the corps, tried to
recall them into line, but the Texans were “too full of impetuosity”, he wrote.
Granbury defended his men’s actions by stating: “My orders were to drive all
opposing forces beyond the Flint River and
halt on this side.” (13)
Cleburne watched through field glasses as his
division wheeled hopelessly to the right and away from the fight. McCown’s
blunder at Murfreesboro
and his subsequent court-marshal had to come to mind. He sent a courier to
Lowrey and rode forward to command Brown and Maney in their attack. But without
Lowrey’s support, the flank attack lost much of its punch and Hardee ordered Cleburne to “make no
further attempt upon the enemy’s works.” Although part of this decision was
because of Lowrey’s error, most of it was as a result of Lee’s failed assault,
which had begun before Brown and Maney attacked. (14)
The situation grew worse. While
the battle raged, Thomas had severed the Macon & Western Railroad north of Jonesboro at East
Point, thus cutting off the Confederates’ supply line.
Hood misjudged this action as a precursor to an attack on Atlanta from Thomas and ordered Lee’s Corps,
Reynolds’ Brigade, and a brigade from Hardee’s Corps to return to the city.
Hardee knew that the force in his front, commanded by Sherman himself, was the
main attack force, but reluctantly obeyed. “Hood’s whole plan of operations was
based upon the hypothesis that Sherman
was moving only a detachment to Jonesborough, whereas in reality he was moving
his army”, wrote Hardee. For the good of the South, Hardee and Cleburne
agreed to stand their ground at Jonesboro;
one corps against six. As Bragg at Perryville, Hood was the last man who knew
where the Federals would strike. (15)
By 1:30am on September 1,
Hardee’s Corps was positioned behind makeshift earthworks in a fishhook
configuration around Jonesboro.
Although Cleburne
was technically still in command of corps, he personally placed his brigades on
the terminating “hook”. So outnumbered were they, that each man along the line
was responsible for one yard of ground, “not quite touching elbows” as one
soldier recalled. As Benham stood by Cleburne,
he saw the blue masses as they formed into line after line. “Our position was a
sorry one”, he wrote. (16)
Sherman, upon learning of Lee’s departure,
ordered Thomas’ army to destroy the remaining corps. “In the after noon”, wrote
Captain Foster, “they charge us surenough”. As the Federal masses charged
towards Cleburne’s
position on the “hook”, they were met with the combined fire of Govan’s Brigade
and Key’s Howitzers. Witnessing how Sherman
was carelessly pushing forward his ranks to overwhelm the Confederates, Benham
wrote, “Death had no appreciable effect upon these exhaustless masses. Moving
with volume and power, like succeeding masses, the masses of blue come on.” For
the time being, however, the assault was driven back amid wild cheers from the
Confederates. Benham recalled, “The ground was strewn with dead, its entire
color changed, it was carpeted with blue.” (17)
Like Tunnel Hill, Cleburne knew that Sherman
would attack again and rode up to Govan’s line. Shortly after 4:45, Sherman sent Davis’
Corps, now reinforced, forward against the same position. The sharpshooters
were dead on their targets as the enveloping blue lines converged on Govan in
the center, Lewis’ Orphan Brigade on the right, and Granbury on the left. They
only had time to fire one volley before the Federals were on them. Gallantly
repulsing the first line with cold steel, the second and third lines were at
last overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Key’s and Swett’s artillerymen stood by
their guns, unloading double canister into their close ranks at a distance of
10 feet. But it was useless. Govan, fighting in hand-to-hand combat with 600 of
his men, the Orphan Brigade, and most of Key’s and Swett’s artillerymen were
surrounded and forced to surrender. Granbury immediately ordered his men to
reform their lines to face the enemy in their front. Hardee, under the
impression that he was giving way, rode toward the Texans to rally them. Above
the noise of battle, Granbury, insulted that Hardee thought his men were
retreating shouted, “General, my men never fall back unless ordered back!” (18)
Meanwhile, Cleburne ordered Irving Buck to guide
Gordon’s Brigade towards the breech. Before he got far, Buck was struck in the
leg with a Minnie ball and returned to Cleburne.
Cleburne sent
Buck to the rear and was met in route to Gordon by Hardee. When asked whether Cleburne had another officer to guide the reserves
forward, Cleburne
responded, “Yes! All of us will go!” and led the brigade personally into the
breech. Assisted by the remnants of Govan’s Brigade, Cleburne and the reserves rushed out of the
woods from the south, gave the Federals the bayonet, and pushed them back over
the works. Cleburne
ordered more artillery brought up and extended the line east with skirmishers
and sharpshooters and constructed entanglements in their front. Sherman’s next assault by Stanley’s
Corps was directed towards the end of the line where Cleburne had made these adjustments and was
repulsed. (19)
Despite inflicting 1,272 casualties on Sherman that day, Hardee
knew that if his men stood their ground that night, he would be encircled by
the morning. Therefore, he wired Hood stating that Jonesboro had fallen and removed his corps
seven miles south to Lovejoy Station. Hood withdrew the rest of his army from Atlanta. Hardee wrote, “The
fall of Atlanta
does not date from the result of the battle of Jonesborough, but from General
Hood’s misconception of his adversary’s plans.” That next morning, the mayor of
Atlanta surrendered the city and asked Sherman “protection for
non-combatants and private property.” Sherman
refused, claiming, “You might as well appeal against the thunderstorm as
against these terrible hardships of war.” (20)
As Sherman
occupied Atlanta, Hood’s army convened at Jonesboro to reform for
an unknown future. Hood hoped to find a scapegoat in Hardee, who he claimed had
displayed “a disgraceful effort.” Hardee refused to serve under Hood any longer
and was transferred. During this truce between armies, Govan, his men, and the
Orphan Brigade were exchanged and returned to their commands. On September 15,
the governor of Georgia
called for a day of prayer and fasting. General Lowrey delivered a sermon to
the division and many were saved.
Upon arrival in Palmetto,
several miles west of Jonesboro,
the troops were met by President Davis. He received a cool reception. “As the
presidential party passed in front of our brigade,” recalled a soldier in
Sears’ Brigade, “Col. Clarke, who was a small man with a thin voice, cried out,
‘Three cheers for President Davis and General Hood!’ Waving aloft his sword,
he, with one or two others, raised a feeble yell. Instantly, someone in the
ranks cried out, ‘Three cheers for General Joe Johnston!’” This was joined by a
defining cheer from Sear’s Brigade and soon caught on to other units until a
Rebel Yell filled the air with calls for Johnston’s
replacement. (21)
As Sherman
seemed concerned only about plundering houses occupied by women, children, and
the aged on his march to the sea, Hood developed a new plan to capture Nashville and turn the
tide of the war. Before this campaign opened, Cleburne requested a leave of the army so he
could marry Miss Tarleton. Hood denied this request, stating that Cleburne was needed in
preparation for the campaign. Cleburne
dutifully saluted, left headquarters, and wrote Sue the bad news. By September
29, Hood’s tattered army began the fateful campaign. As the troops crossed the
boarder from Alabama into Tennessee
on November 21, they were greeted by an ominous sign which read, “Tennessee, a grave, or a
free home.” (22)
“We are going to carry the war into Africa,
but I fear we will not be as successful as Scipio was”, Cleburne told Nash concerning the campaign.
One soldier, a member of a Florida
regimental band recalled a speech the general gave.
He spoke to us at
some length, explaining to us the purpose of the rear move—the forced march—the
result, if it succeeded, the consequences if it failed. He urged every man to
do his whole duty, to stand firm by the righteous cause they had espoused. He
pictured to us Ireland in
its downfallen and trampled condition and told us if we failed our condition
would be much worse than that of Ireland’s, as long as that spirit
of hate and revenge lived in the North. In closing his address that night he
turned his face towards the skies and with all the fervency of his soul he
exclaimed, “if this cause that is so dear to my heart is doomed to fail, I pray
heaven may let me fall with it, while my face is toward the enemy and my arm
battling for that which I know to be right.”
The
soldier wrote, “It was one of the most stirring patriotic speeches I ever
listened to.” (23)
Shortly before the Confederates
marched into Tennessee,
Nathan Bedford Forrest was assigned to take command of the army’s 6,000
cavalry. With these, Forrest cleared the road to Columbia
on the 19 and the army began its 115-mile march, through a snowstorm, to Nashville two days later. Now
in Cheatham’s Corps, Cleburne
led his 3,000-man division north, ridding on his favorite horse, Red Pepper. On
the 24, Schofield, after a night march, reached Columbia
in Middle Tennessee ahead of Forrest and constructed entrenchments along the
north banks of Duck
River. His force now
amounted to 23,000 infantry and artillery plus 700 cavalry.
Arriving south of Columbia on the 25, the
army took a brief rest and camped around Ashwood, the home of the late Leonidas
Polk. Cleburne
enjoyed seeing Lucius Polk again and the army was on the move again the
following day. After marching through the rain on the 26, the general dismounted
from his horse and visited the Polk family cemetery. With its stand of tall
trees and Gothic-style church, it was almost identical to the Athnowen churchyard in Ireland where he had grown up and
where his father was buried. Noticing the general’s somber mood as he walked
among the tombstones, Chief of Ordnance Hill remained behind with Red Pepper.
Hill recalled that Cleburne
solemnly remarked, “It would not be hard to die if one could be buried in such
a beautiful spot.” (24)
The next day, the army arrived
in Columbia. Hood had no
intention of attacking Schofield’s well entrenched line north of the river.
Instead, he ordered Lee’s Corps and most of the army’s artillery to hold the
Federal general in place while the rest of the army crossed two miles upstream,
thus marching between Schofield and the Federals at Spring Hill. Early on the
morning of the 29, the Confederates were hurriedly crossing the cold waters of Duck River
on a pontoon bridge. With Forrest leading the way, the infantry marched the 17
miles towards Spring Hill. Along the way, young and old cheered the army on.
One woman offered to cook Cleburne
and his staff a fine turkey dinner for that night. “No, ma'am,” replied Cleburne,
"we'll be too busy tonight, but tomorrow night I'll be back for it with
many thanks.” (25)
At 4pm, Cleburne arranged his division on the west
bank of McCutcheon’s Creek for an attack on the Federal flank in front of
Spring Hill. With Forrest on his right, the two generals advanced their men
with swords drawn, swinging to the right. Granbury and Govan’s men, positioned
on the left and center of the division, hit Federal general Bradley’s flank and
rear while Lowrey, on the right, hit his front. After Bradley’s inexperienced
line broke, the division surged forward, but was checked by a crossfire from 18
guns southeast of town and two Napoleons in their front. These just barely
escaped capture as Granbury’s Texans charged them. His objective of breaking
the Federal right flank completed, Cleburne
pulled his men into cover at the base of the hill. At this moment, General Lane was
sighted advancing double quick towards Cleburne’s
line with his brigade. Calling to Lieutenant Mangum, Cleburne instructed him to order Granbury
into position behind a rail fence. Just as Mangum was ridding away, an
artillery shell burst directly above the general, wounding Red Pepper in the
hip. Fighting to gain control of the horse, Mangum asked Cleburne if he was all right. Cleburne responded that
he was and told Mangum to direct Granbury into position.
The sun had set by 4: 30pm that
afternoon and Cleburne
awaited the sound of General John Calvin Brown’s musketry on his right, which
had been previously decided upon as the signal to advance his men. After two
hours, Cleburne
decided that Brown was not going to attack and led the injured Red Pepper to
the rear. While in rout, he met a major from Hood which instructed not to move up the turnpike until
he received further orders. Meanwhile, Hood was fast asleep in the Thompson Mansion. After setting his initial
orders of attack that afternoon, Hood had been un-strapped from his saddle and
had eaten a fine dinner before retiring early with a laudanum-induced sleep.
That night, not only did the Federals escape from Spring Hill, but also
Schofield withdrew from the north bank of the Duck
River and passed by Hood’s sleeping
army in rout for Franklin.
What Hood had expected to be his greatest military stroke had become a deadly
blunder, for both the South and for Cleburne.
Seeing that no Federals occupied
Spring Hill on the morning of November 30, Cleburne talked with General Brown about who
allowed them to escape. Telling Brown that Hood blamed him for the escape, Brown
noticed that “General Cleburne was quite angry, and evidently was deeply hurt,
under the conviction that the Commander-in-Chief had censured him.” Brown
wrote:
I asked General
Cleburne who was responsible for the escape of the enemy during the afternoon
and night previous. In reply to that inquiry he indulged in some criticisms of
a command occupying a position on the left, and concluded by saying that “of
course the responsibility rests with the Commander-in-Chief, as he was upon the
field during the afternoon and was fully advised during the night of the
movement of the enemy.
At
this point, the generals were interrupted by orders to attend a meeting at
headquarters. (26)
Cleburne and Brown met
Cheatham, Bate, Stewart, Forrest, and Hood, who looked both furious and
exhausted, inside the parlor of the Harrison House. Hood began by stating the
Federals would not stand at Franklin
and he suggested an immediate frontal attack, despite the absence of Lee’s
Corps. Without waiting for comments, Hood directed Stewart to attack the enemy
on their left flank while Cleburne
and Brown attacked the center and consequently the deadliest part of the field.
Momentarily stunned, the generals did not say a word. Forrest said, “General
Hood, if you will give me one strong division of infantry with my cavalry, I
will agree to flank the Federals from their works within two hours’ time.” Now
that Forrest had taken the initiative, Cheatham spoke up: “I do not like the
looks of this fight. The enemy has an excellent position and are well
fortified.” Despite the unanimous disapproval of the planned attack, Hood would
not be refused. Following the generals outside on his prosthetic leg, Hood gave
Cleburne his
instructions, which sounded like the death sentence it was:
General, form your
division to the right of the pike, letting your left overlap the same. General
Brown will form on the left with his right overlapping your left. I wish you to
move on the enemy. Give orders to your men not to fire a gun until you run the
Yankee skirmish line from behind the first line of works in your front, then
press them and shoot them in their backs as the run to the main line; then
charge the enemy works. Franklin is the key to Nashville and Nashville
is the key to independence.
Mounting
his horse, Cleburne
stared Hood straight in the eyes and said, “General, I will take the works or
fall in the attempt.” (27)
In a final council of war, Govan
noticed the general seemed “greatly depressed”. Cleburne emphasized the importance of using
of the bayonet in the assault. As the council broke up, Govan saluted and
remarked, “Well, General, few of us will ever return to Arkansas to tell the story of this battle.” Cleburne replied, “Well,
Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men.” Ridding up to Breezy Hill, Cleburne studied the
battlefield. A member of the sharpshooting squad recalled:
General Cleburne
rode up to where we were standing and remarked that he had left his field
glasses behind and that he wished the use of a telescope. Lt. Ozanne…quickly
detached the long telescope from his gun, adjusted the focus, and handed it to
General Cleburne who laid the telescope across a stump and looked long and
carefully over the field and remarked, “They have three lines of works,” and
then, sweeping the field again as if to make himself certain, said, “and they
are completed.”
The
Federals, behind their semicircle defenses enclosing the town of Franklin to the Harpeth
River, were frantically
at work, preparing for the assault. At the center of this semicircle was the
Carter House and its outbuildings, from which the soldiers were pulling wooden
planks for the construction of breastworks. Between the main house on the left
and the cotton gin of the right ran the Columbia-Nashville Pike along which Cleburne would guide his
division towards the gin, with Brown on his left. From his position on Breezy
Hill to the Federal line was a distance twice as long as the ground over which
Pickett charged the final day of Gettysburg.
On top of this, Hood ordered the storming of the works without a preliminary
artillery barrage. (28)
Before Cleburne mounted his horse, he walked over to
Major Benham, the staff officer who had disagreed with him concerning the
enlistment of slaves. Benham recalled, “I shall never forget him, with his old
gray cap and his gray cloak hanging loosely; he seemed to have grown older…and
I shall not forget his last words when we parted, as he extended his hand
carelessly and said, ‘Farewell, we may not meet again, but we shall all do our
duty.’ I took it then as one of his gentle ways of admonishing subordinate
soldiers, but the words sank deep in my heart.” (29)
Cleburne tried once more to dissuade Hood
from this mad scheme. W.J. Ridling of the 6th Arkansas overheard the conversation: “I
heard Pat Cleburne and General Hood talking. Cleburne wanted Hood to go above of below the
river and cut them off but Hood said, ‘No, we will mass our forces and march
them down the pike.’” According to Hood, his last meeting with Cleburne went differently. In his postwar
memoir, Advance and Retreat, Hood
falsely claims Cleburne
said, “General, I am ready, and have more hope in final success of our cause than
I have had at any time since the first gun was fired.” In response Hood said,
“God grant it!” (30)
At the base of Winstead and
Breezy Hills on the Confederate left and center, stretching to the woods and
terminating near the Harpeth
River on the right, each
man waited with dread his unit’s order to advance. Lieutenant Collins recalled
seeing the generals “ride away slowly, each to his own command and the word
soon comes down the line: ‘Men, Gen. Hood says we must take those works.’
Officers of the line acquaint the men with the direful undertaking before
them.” At 4pm, with a dead stillness in the air and the sun setting in a
crimson sky, the order to advance was given. Stewart’s Corps, composed of
Loring’s Walthall’s and French’s divisions, instantly moved forward through the
woods on Cleburne’s
right. Next, Chalmers and Bate, on Brown’s left moved forward, covered in their
march by a low range of hills. Finally, Cheatham’s Corps, the Confederate
center, advanced. Collins wrote, “The long line of Confederate infantry moved
down the hill and on through the open valley, with banners flying and bands
playing our national airs—‘Dixie’ and the
‘Bonnie Blue Flag.’ Gen. Cleburne, on his fine bay mare, leads his division,
the lion-hearted Granbury leads his brigades of Texans.” (31)
Although both Cleburne and brown
had sent their sharpshooters forward prior to the general advance to clear some
of the artillery, soon a storm of long-rang solid shot was tearing its way
through the infantry or bursting or the air. John M. Copley recalled:
The artillerymen who were manning these guns had a fine opportunity of
testing their skill at long range. Our progress at first was rather slow, on
account of the obstructions just in our front, which consisted of the beech
grove with the tops of the trees fronting us; but we surmounted this brush and
fallen timber, and began to move a little faster. A light skirmish line from
our lines of battle was thrown forward, which was soon met by a similar line
from the Federals behind their advance line of entrenchments. These two lines
quickly engaged in a lively skirmish fight, but as our lines of battle
advanced, their line retired behind the line of works which they had recently
left. Our line halted, lay down, and fired upon them in this position, until
our lines of battle moved up close enough for them to join us, and become part
of the front line. We were now ordered to fix bayonets, fire, and charge the
first line of works.
General Gordon, on Cleburne’s right recalled: “With wild shouts
we dashed forward upon this line. The enemy delivered one volley at our rushing
ranks and precipitately fled for refuge to his main and rear line. At this
juncture the shout was raised, “Go into the works with them.” This cry was
taken up and vociferated from a thousand throats as we rushed on after the
flying forces we had routed—killing some in our running fire and capturing
others who were slow on foot,--sustaining but small losses ourselves, until we
arrived within about one hundred paces of their main line and stronghold, when
it seemed to me that hell itself had exploded in our faces. The enemy had thus
long reserved their fire for the safety of their routed comrades who were
flying to them for protection, and who were just in front of and mingled with
the pursuing Confederates. When it became no longer safe for themselves to
reserve their fire, they opened upon us (regardless of their own men who were
mingled with us) such a hailstorm of shot and shell, musketry and canister that
the very atmosphere was hideous with the shrieks of the messengers of death.” (32)
Lieutenant Mangum wrote:
All this time Cleburne was with his men. It was his custom,
especially when any important charge was to be made, to follow his troops into
the midst of the battle, and it has frequently been a cause of wonder to his
friends that he came from so many dangers unscathed; but up to this time he
seems to borne a charmed life. And now as his command dashed forward into the
teeth of that fiery storm which burst from those main works, he followed them.
The writer had been sent to locate a battery, but while executing the order
received a message from General Cleburne, through Captain S. P. Hanly of his
staff, to return to him immediately. Reporting as ordered he found the general
about the center of his division, immediately behind the line of battle. Seeing
the writer he merely said, "It is too late," and the added, "Go
on with Granberry," while he turned his horse to the right and galloped up
to Govan's brigade which was rushing madly for the enemy's works. His receding
form was the last sight the writer had ever had of General Cleburne alive.
“Through
the level plain, the valley of death, the whole line was now plunging onward,
broken but closing up, thinning but still pressing forward. On all sides men
sank out of sight, the ground was thick with the dead, the fallen seemed more
numerous than living. Officers and soldiers, generals and privates, fell side
by side.” (33)
Mangum made it to Granbury’s
Brigade just as the Texans and Govan’s Arkansans were breaching the line.
Granbury yelled, “Forward men, forward! Never let it be said that Texans lag in
the fight!” Just then, a ball struck him in the cheek and passed out through
his brain. Falling forward with his hands covering his face, Granbury died.
“Better soldiers and braver men were never marshaled than this Texas brigade, and
Granbury was, in every way, worthy to command such a brigade of heroes. Well
may the Lone Star State
be proud of every man in that brigade,” wrote Mangum. (34)
Meanwhile, as dozens fell beside
him, Cleburne
pushed forward, yelling for his men to “Go into the works!” About 80 yards from
the enemy line, Cleburne’s
horse was shot from under him. Seeing the general go down hard, the chief surgeon,
Dr. Linthicum rushed to his assistance. Noticing blood trickling down his boot,
the doctor tried to persuade the general to return to the rear. Cleburne shouted that he could
not leave his men and called for another horse. A staff officer quickly dismounted
and gave the general his horse. Before he got in the saddle, however, this
horse was shot from under him. Cleburne
rushed forward on foot, sword in hand and waving his kepi. Fifty yards from the
works, Cleburne
saw Granbury and Govan’s men breech the line, clubbing away the defenders and
planting the division’s bullet-ridden battle flag on top of the works; an
instant later, a single ball hit his chest and penetrated his heart.
Despite a counter-attack, the
men of Granbury and Govan’s brigades tenaciously held on to their portion of
the breeched works. That night, the Federals withdrew across the Harpeth,
leaving the survivors of Hood’s army in possession of the field. Sixteen days
later, Hood would follow up on his “victory” with the final destruction of the
Army of Tennessee at Nashville.
After the battle, the report
that Cleburne
was missing ran through the ranks. John McQuaide and two other soldiers
searched for him among the dead and found him about dawn, December 1. “He lay
flat upon his back, as if to sleep, with his military cap partly over his
eyes…He wore a white linen shirt which was stained with blood on the front part
of the left side…He was in sock feet, his boots having been stolen. His watch,
dress sword, belt and other valuables were all gone; his body having been
robbed during the night.” Along with the body of another general, John Adams, Cleburne’s body was taken
in a wagon to John McGavock’s house, Carnton. (35)
One of the Texans recalled,
“General Hood was smoking a fine Cegar…He stops this man and asks him what Div.
he belongs to. The man told him Cleburn’s Division. Hood asked him about his
command. The man told him that most of them were around Gen. Cleburn’s body.
Hood took his fine cegar out of his mouth and kept his head down for half an
hour.” That morning, fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters were looking for
their relatives among the 6,261 casualties on the field. Among these, 6
generals and 13 regimental commanders were killed. Captain Foster was furious.
“And the wails and cries of widows and orphans made at Franklin Tenn. Nov 30th
1864 will heat up the fires of the bottomless pit to burn the soul of Gen J B
Hood for Murdering their husbands and fathers at that place that day. It can’t
be called anything else but cold blooded Murder.” Sam Watkins wrote:
It lives in the
memory of the poor old Rebel Soldier who went through that trying and terrible
ordeal. We meet no more on earth. But up yonder, beyond the sunset and the
night, away beyond the clouds and tempest, away beyond the stars that ever
twinkle and shine in the blue vault above us, away yonder by the great white
throne, and by the river of life, where the Almighty and Eternal God sits,
surrounded by angles and archangels and the redeemed of earth, we meet again
and see those noble and brave spirits who gave up their lives for their
country’s cause that night at Franklin, Tennessee. A life given for one’s
country is never lost. (36)
John Watson Morton, artillery chief of
Forrest’s Cavalry witnessed the battle from Winstead Hill. Years later, he
wrote a poem in the Stonewall of the West’s honor:
A long farewell,
we give thee up, with all thy bright renown.
A chieftain hero
on earth is lost, in heaven an angle found.
Above thy grave a
wail is heard—a nation mourns her dead;
A nobler for the
South ne’er died, a braver never bled. (37)
Sources
1: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter
14 page 202
2: Co.
Aytch: chapter 12 page 139
: Stonewall of the West: chapter 11 page
216
3: Lone Star General: page 81
4: Co.
Aytch: chapter 12 page 142
: Ibid
5: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter
14 page 199
: Stonewall of the West: chapter 11 page
218
:
Narrative of Military Operations: chapter 11 page 344
: Co. Aytch: chapter 12 page 144
6: Lone Star General: page 83
:
Narrative of Military Operations: chapter 11 page 353
7: Biographical Sketches: page 159
: Pat
Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 14 page 201
: Ibid
8: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter
15 page 205
9: Stonewall of the West: chapter 12 page 228
10:
Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 15 page 211
: Co. Aytch: chapter 13 page 168
: Southern Invincibility: Chapter 25 page
259
: Lone Star General: page 85
11:
Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 16 page 218
12:
Stonewall of the West: chapter 12 page 236
13:
One of Cleburne’s
Command: chapter 3 page 125
: Stonewall of the
West: chapter 12 page 237
: Lone Star General: page 86
14:
Stonewall of the West: chapter 12 page 239
15:
Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 16 page 227
16:
Stonewall of the West: chapter 12 page 240
: Ibid
17:
One of Cleburne’s
Command: chapter 3 page 126
: Stonewall of the
West: chapter 12 page 240
: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter
16 page 225
18:
Lone Star General: page 87
19: Stonewall
of the West: chapter 12 page 241
20:
Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 16 page 227
: Lone Star General: page 87
: Ibid
21:
Southern Invincibility: Chapter 28 page 295
22: Southern Invincibility: Chapter 28 page 298
23:
A Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 10, page 233
: Pat Cleburne
Confederate General: chapter 17 page 230
: Ibid
24:
Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 17 page 233
25:
Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 10, page 244
26: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter
18 page 246-7
27: Stonewall of the West: prologue page 5
: Ibid
: Meteor Shining
Brightly: Chapter 10, page 266
: Stonewall of the
West: prologue page 6
28: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter
18 page 249
: Stonewall of the West: chapter 13: page
255
: Meteor Shining
Brightly: Chapter 10, page 268
29: Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 8, page 198
30: Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 10, page 272
: Ibid:
page 269
31: Lone Star General: page 94
: Ibid:
pages 94-95
32: A Sketch of the Battle of Franklin,
Tenn. with Reminiscences of Camp Douglas by
John Copley: article
found at http://docsouth.unc.edu/copley/copley.html#jcop28
: Pat Cleburne
Confederate General: chapter 18 page 251
33: http://members.aol.com/ihaiw/Battles/Franklin.htm
:
Ibid
34: Lone Star
General: page 96
35: Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 10, page 278
36: Lone Star General: page 96
: One of Cleburne’s Command: chapter 3 page 151
: Co.
Aytch: chapter 16 page 222
37: The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest’s
Cavalry by John Watson Morton, Capt.: page 332